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COMMENTS
THE STATUS OF ENTIRETIES IN FLORIDA
During the course of the years many states' have found it expedient to
eliminate the estate by the entirety from their laws either for the reason that
their married woman's property acts have abrogated the doctrine that hus-
band and wife are one, or because statutes have been enacted which destroy
the right of survivorship, and which through interpretation destroy the very
purpose of the estate. Parenthetically, Florida, along with a small minority,2
has determined that the enactment of the Married Woman's Property Act3
has no effect on the estate 4 for the basic reason that the entirety is not sepa-
rate properly within the purview of the statute. Similarly, a statute5 elimi-
nating the right of survivorship in joint tenancies has no effect upon the
estate because, being in abrogation of the common law, it must be strictly
construed.6 The result is that the estate exists in Florida in its original com-
mon law form7 except where modified by statute.8 Several such modifica-
tions and judicial determinations have appeared in recent years. Conse-
quently, it is appropriate, and almost mandatory, to review this general field
of law with particular emphasis upon the termination of such an estate.
GENERALLY
The basis of the estate is that the husband and wife are one person in
contemplation of law? According to Blackstone,'0 " . . . the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
1. Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tueky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
2. Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming.
3. FLA. CONST. Art. XI, § 1; FLA. STAT. § 708.01 et seq. (1949).
4. Newman v, Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 119 Fla. 641, 160
So. 745 (1935); Logan Moore Lumber Co. v. Legato, 100 Fla. 1455, 131 So. 381
I1930; Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925); English v. English, 66 Fla.
27, So. o22 (1913)- but ef. Matthews v. McCain, 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323
(1936); Ohio Butterine o.v. vHarrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920) (wherein it
was held that the Act did not eliminate the entirety, but that it did modify it to the
extent that it gave the wife the right to control her indivisible share).
5. FLA. STA. § 689.I5 (1949).
6. Bailey v. Smith, supra note 4; English v. English, supra note 4.
7. FL. STAT. § 2.10 (1949) ("The common and statute laws of England which
are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down
to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the
said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the United States and the acts of the legislature of this state."); Sheldon v. Waters, 168
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1948); Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932);
Bailey v. Smith, supra note 4, English v. English, supra note 4.
8. Matthews v. McClain, supra note 4; Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, supra
note 4.
9. Lang v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 289 U.S. 109, 111 (1933); Bailey v. Smith,
suPra note 4.
10. 1 BL. ComM.* 442.
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incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband . .. " The conclu-
sion in law is that, although for all practicalities there are two people in-
volved, the tenancy must be considered as belonging to one person. Despite
the fact that the doctrine of oneness is a creature of the common law, it was
recognized even in that time that a husband and wife who chose to receive
property as an estate other than by the entirety could do so irrespective of
their social union." Thus, it is not mandatory that they hold by the entire-
ty when they own property jointly.
When a conveyance is made to husband and wife during the time of
their coverture their intentions will determine the type of estate that is to
be created,12 but where no contrary intention is shown a tenancy by the
entirety will be presumed.' 3 Just as in joint tenancies, it is essential that the
unities of interest, title, time and possession be present. 14  A fifth unity15
that is unique to the entirety is that of a valid marriage. Consequently,
when a marriage is void in the eyes of the law there is no possible means of
creating the estate,'0 although a conveyance to a man and woman, who are
parties to a voidable marriage, will be given full force and effect.17 The
courts have gone so far as to say, in effectuating the creation of the estate,
that the husband and wife need not be described as such in a deed,'8 and
even further that it is not even necessary that the marital relationship be
referred to at all.' 9
When the husband owns property in his own name and desires to create
an entirety the customary procedure is for him to convey to a third party
and for that person to then grant the property to the husband and wife
jointly. By virtue of a fairly recent statute,20 it is now possible for him to
convey directly to his wife without the use of a dummy.2' It has been
argued that such a conveyance is invalid because the husband cannot be
both grantor and grantee in the same deed,22 but this contention has been
legally brushed aside since "the deed executed by the husband to the wife in
legal effect conveys to the wife and reserves to the husband."
23
The estate may exist both in real and personal property. 24 In realty
IL Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
12. White v. White, 42 So.2d 719 (1949); Matthews vs. McCain, supra note
4; Bailey v. Smith, supra note 4.
13. Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941) Dixon v. Becker,
134 Fla. 547, 184 So. 114 (1938).
14. Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); Ohio Butterine
Co. v. Hargrave, supra note 4.15. Ibid.
16. Kerivan v. Fogal, 156 Fla. 92, 22 So.2d 584 (1945) (a bigamous marriage).
17. Johnson v. Landefeld, supra note 14 (uncle and niece married).
18. American Central Ins. Co. v. Vhitlock, 122 Pa. 363, 365, 165 So. 380,381 J1936).
19. Ibid.
20. FLA. STAT. § 689.11 (1949).
21. Hunt v. Covington 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941).
22 on v. Landefeld, supra note 14 (dissent).
23' Ibid. (majority).
24. Sheldon v. Waters, supra note 7; White v. White, supra note 12; Bailey v.
Smith, supra note 4.
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it may be created in fee,25 for life,21 for years, 7 in homestead property,28 or
in any other chattel real.29  Formerly, it could exist in fee tail 0 but by
statute5' this type of estate has been abolished in Florida. The main distinc-
tion between the estate in realty and in personalty is that in the latter the
parties have the right to partition. a2  There are no specific statutory provi-
sions for the creation of the estate in personalty,33 but it has generally been
held that there must be a specific intent at the time of creation.3 '
Once the entirety is created certain representative features arise. 3,
Each spouse is seised of the whole estate and does not take a share or a
divisible part. 6  Neither one can individually convey or forfeit any part of
the estate so as to defeat the right of the survivor.' 7  Nor can there be a sev-
erance by the act of either.-8 Definitively, this means that there is no right
of partition during their joint lives, or so long as the estate exists, although,
as pointed out previously, there is such a right in the case of personal
property.
The estate, by operation of law, upon the death of either party, remains
in the surviving spouse to the exclusion of the heirs of the deceased.39  The
survivor does not take by inheritance, or even by the usual method of sur-
vivorshipA0  Rather, he continues to hold the whole estate by virtue of the
25. Matthews v. McClain, snkora note 4.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Coleman v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941); Menendez v. Rod-
riguez, sura note 7.
29. Matthews v. McClain, snuTa note 4 (a leasehold in land is a chattel real).
30. Ibid.
31. FLA. STAT. § 689.14 (1949) ("no real estate shall be entailed in this state.
Any instrument purporting to create an estate tail shall, notwithstanding the rule in
Shelly's case, be deemed to create an estate for life in the first taker (that is in the
donee or tenant in tail) with remainder per stirpes to the issue of the first taker in
being at the time of his death.").
32. Sheldon v. Waters, supra note 7.
33. Doing v. Riley. 176 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1949); Mann v. Etchells, 132 Fla.
409, 182 So. 198 (1938); Merrill v. Adkins, 131 Fla. 478, 180 So. 41 (1938).
34. Doing v. Riley, supra note 33; White v. White, supra note 12; Matthews
v. McCain, sumra note 4.
Examples of the estate in personalty are: White v. White, supra note 12 (rents
from a house which is held by the entirety); Dodson v. Nat. Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla.
371, 31 So.2d 402 (1947) (income from the sale of real estate which is an entirety);
Merrill v. Adkins, supra note 33 (payment of a debt to one of the spouses which is
owed to the husband and wife jointly).
35. 2 BL. COMM. *182 (" . . . if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife,
they are neither properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common; for husband and wife
being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but
both are seized of the entirety, per tout, et non per my; the consequence of which is,
that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of
the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor.")
36. Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc of the United States, supra note 4;
Bailey v. Smith, supra note 4; English v. English, supra note 4.
37. Rader v. First Nat. Bank in Palm Beach, 42 So.2d I (Fla. 1949); Logan Moore
Lumber Co. v. Legato, supra note 4; English v. English, supra note 4.
38. Ibid.
39. Knapp v. Fredricksen, supra note 13; Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So.
797 (1939); Menendez v. Rodriguez, supra note 7.
40. Palm Beach Estates v. Croker, 106 Fla. 617, 143 So. 792 (1932).
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original title.41 The only change is that a possibility of survivorship has been
removed. This, too, finds its reason and very existence in the doctrine that
the husband and wife are one. Fundamentally, when one of the parties
dies the only alteration in the estate is that a part of the one person is dead42
-almost as if the survivor had merely lost an arm or a leg. Thus, the sur-
vivor's title dates from the creation of the entirety, and not from the time
of death of the other spouse. Since the property does not pass by inheri-
tance the obvious result of an attempt by either party to devise the property
to the exclusion of the other will be a complete nullity of such devise.4a
During the joint lives of the husband and wife, the property held by
the entireties may not be levied upon for debts of one spouse. 44 By reason
of the legal relation of the parties it is required that there be a unity in
encumbering the estate,45 and it logically follows that it cannot be executed
against for the separate debts of either the husband or the wife. Under the
common law rule the rents and profits of an entirety could be sequestered to
satisfy the debts of the husband, but because of the Married Woman's
Property Act,40 which destroyed the husband's right to control the wife's
share, this is no longer possible. 47
Except for mechanic's liens, the only time the debts of one of the par-
ties may attach to the entirety is when it is apparent to the court that the
estate has been created as a fraud upon the creditors. 48  Thus, in bankruptcy
proceedings the entirety is exempt from liability unless it is clearly shown
that there is fraud involved. 40 The mechanic's lien is anomalous to the gen-
eral rule, since, by legislative enactment"0 it may attach to the entirety when
contracted by either party individually.> The statutory rationalization 2 is
41. Bailey v. Smith, supra note 4; English v. English, supra note 4.
42. Ibid.
43. Hall v. Roberts, 146 Fla. 444, 1 So.2d 579 (1941).
44. Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936) (estate was subject tojudgment against both husband and wife in spite of the fact that they weren't described
as such in the judgment); Lindsley v. Phare, 115 Fla. 454, 155 So, 812 (1934); State
ex Tel Molter v. Johnson, 107 Fla. 47, 144 So. 299 (1932); Anderson v. Trueman, 100
Fla. 727, 130 So. 12 (1930); Allardice & Allardice Inc. v. Weatherlow, 98 Fla. 475, 124
So. 38 (1929); Ferris-Lee Lumber Co. v. Fulghum, 98 Fla. 171, 123 So. 697 (1929);
Phare v. Randall, 97 Fla. 858, 122 So. 217 (1929); Hart v. Atwood, 96 Fla. 667, 119
So. 116 (1928); Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, supra note 4.
45. Allardice & Allardice Inc. v. Weatherlow, supra note 44.
46. FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1949).
47. Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hlargrave, supra note 4.
48. Whetstone v. Coslick, 117 Fla. 203, 157 So. 666 (1934); Ohio Butterine Co,
v. Hargrave, supra note 4.
49. Richardson v. Grill, 138 Fla. 787, 190 So. 255 (1939).
50. FLA. STAT. § 84.12 (1949).
51. Le Roy v. Reynolds, 141 Fla. 586, 193 So. 843 (1940); Logan Moore Lumber
Co. v. Legato, supra note 4.
52. FLA. STAT. § 84.12 (1949) ("When the contract for improving real property
is made with husband or wife who is not separated and living apart from his or her spouse
and the property is owned by the other or both, the husband or wife who contracts shall
be deemed to be the agent of the other to the extent of subjecting the right, title orinterest of the other in said propert to liens under this chapter unless such other shall,
within ten days after learning of such contract, give the contractor and file with the clerk
of the circuit court of the county in which the property is situated written notice of his
or her objection thereto.").
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that each party is acting as agent for the other when contracting for labor or
material. The essential characteristic is that the labor performed or the
materials furnished must be done with the knowledge or assent of both
parties, although only one of them does the actual contracting.53
The tax problems in relation to the estate by the entirety are numerous
and very often insurmountable. Most of them point to the advisability of
holding property in some form other than by the entirety. As Albert Bern-
stein said in his article "Tax Dangers in Estates by the Entirety","4
".. . attorneys should no longer advise clients to use estates by the entirety in
all purchases of property. Such advice is archaic. . . . The estate by the
entirety might be the solution to the problems of some clients, but, as a
general rule, it has outlived its usefulness."
Because of its highly specialized nature it is not practical to cover
the tax problems in this article. Then, too, such a discussion would only
be repetitious of the above quoted comparatively exhaustive study. But, a
recent case in the tax field is worthy of comment because it has completely
changed the previous law in point, and has possibly opened the door to
fraud between the parties. It was the former rule that where the estate was
put up for tax sale due to a default the entirety would be revived if either of
the parties involved was the purchaser. 6 The theory followed was that the
man and wife were one, the default of one was that of the other, and the
purchase by one was of necessity the purchase of both. Applying the doc-
trine that repurchase by one joint tenant at a tax sale revived the estate,
and joining it with the fact that the entirety is essentially a joint tenancy
modified by the unity of husband and wife, the court concluded that the
rule applicable to joint tenancies would also have to apply to entireties. In
a recent decision 7 involving joint tenants the court reversed the field. The
gist of the opinion was that under the new County Quiet Title Statute 8
the county, when it forecloses defaulted property, takes a new and clear title,
and consequently, there is nothing remaining which can be revived. Since
the very basis for the revival of the entirety was its similarity to the joint
tenancy, it presumably follows that the purchase of the defaulted entirety
by one of the spouses will not in the future revive the estate. Assuming this
conclusion to be correct it will be possible for one of the parties, through
some subterfuge, to default on taxes and purchase the property at tax sale
free and clear of the entirety.
TERMINATION
There are varied means of terminating the estate by the entirety. The
normal determination is brought about by a conveyance of the property,
53. Allardice & Allardice Inc. v. Weatherlow, sup~ra note 44.
54. 1 MIAMI L.O. 86 (1947).
55. Logan v. Ward, 48 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1950).
56. Spencer v. Spencer, 160 Fla. 749, 36 So.2d 424 (1948); Andrews v. Andrews,
155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945).
57. See note 55 supra.
58. FLA. STAT. § 194.47 et seq. (1949).
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through divorce, or by the death of one of the spouses. But, termination
may also occur when there is either a murder of one spouse by the other or
a simultaneous death of both parties.
Conveyance
The right to partition of personal property, and the right of survivorship
have been previously discussed, so we proceed to the subject of conveyanc-
ing by the parties. Such a conveyance amounts to an absolute termination
of the estate and does not act as a partition.5 9 In order to make the convey-
ance complete it is necessary that the husband and wife sign in the presence
of two attesting witnesses.6 0 The witnesses in turn must sign the deed and
it must then be notarized."' It is mandatory2 that the wife attach a sepa-
rate acknowledgment to the conveyance. 63 The importance of the acknowl-
edgment to the purchaser may be realized when one contemplates the result
in a fairly recent decision 4 in which the grantee of the entirety was refused
specific performance on a contract for sale of the entirety merely because the
wife failed to acknowledge. After these requisites are carried out, the only
step remaining in order to make a complete conveyance is delivery. 65
A peculiar problem arises when either party attempts to convey the
entirety without the joinder of the other. Such a conveyance is not abso-
lutely void. If attacked during the life of both parties to the entirety it will
be set aside, but if allowed to stand until the death of one of the spouses
certain ramifications arise. In a hypothetical case, where the husband indi-
vidually conveys the property, and subsequently dies, any rights the grantee
might have had are extinguished. The reason for this is found in the rules
on the right of survivorship. Since the wife would retain the whole estate
by operation of law, having been relieved of the possibility of survivorship,
there was never anything that the husband had to grant away. Taking the
same hypothetical case but substituting the wife's death for that of the hus-
band's the problem becomes a little more complex and the result completely
contrary. In the latter situation the conveyance would be upheld.66  The
only basis the wife would have had during her lifetime to attack it would be
by virtue of her possibility of survivorship, and that possibility, being per-
sonal to the party, does not survive to her heirs or representatives. The hus-
band, on the other hand, having previously granted away all his rights in
the estate, is estopped by the courts from ever attacking his own conveyance.
59. Maxwell v. Sullivan, 123 Fla. 263, 160 So. 575 (1936).
60. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1936).
61. Ibid.
62. FLA. STAT. § 693.03 (1949); Wilkins v. Fears, 78 Fla. 78, 82 So. 762 (1919).
63 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, supra note 60; Oates v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 113 Fla. 678, 152 So. 671 (1933).
64. Berlin v. Jacobs, 157 Fla. 14, 24 So.2d 717 (1946).
65. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, supra note 60.




In divorce the court will retain jurisdiction to determine the distribu-
tion of the entirety. 7 By statute and judicial decision it has been continu-
ously determined in Florida that upon the advent of divorce the estate imme-
diately becomes a tenancy in common. 5 ' The essential of the entirety is that
the husband and wife are one. Once the divorce is granted the fiction of the
unity is destroyed and the parties are left in a position similar to the unmar-
ried man and woman. The result is that each party owns an undivided one-
half interest of the common 9 and both have the right to partition. 0 When
the tenancy is created after the divorce proceedings, partition does not follow
as a matter of course. It is a right vested in the parties, but if they desire
to continue to hold the estate in common there is nothing to compel them
to exercise it.'
The problem that continuously confronts the courts in divorce suits is
whether an entirety purchased solely out of the funds of one party is of such
a nature that it may be made a tenancy in common after the divorce is
granted. The solution is the application of the presumption that a gift has
been made to the other party.72  Such a presumption may only be rebutted
by conclusive evidence and it is noteworthy that it has been overcome only
once before the Supreme Court of Florida. 3 Once the gift is presumed, the
parties hold equal financial interests in the estate, and there is a logical
foundation for the creation of a tenancy in common.
Extending the problem one step further, where the husband purchases
the estate entirely out of his own funds but expects remuneration from his
wife for her share, the court is still prone towards the creation of a tenancy
in common.7 4 The result is that the common is created, but the wife's
obligation to repay her debt survives. It appears that the reason the courts
go to this extreme to protect the interests of the parties is the uniqueness of
land. A half interest in land is usually greater than the sum paid for it. It
naturally follows that if the facts were reversed and the wife was the pur-
chaser, the same result would be achieved. In a similar situation, but where
the evidence of the debt was less conclusive, the court found it expedient to
apply the doctrine of presumption of gift 5 Thus, the tenancy in common
was still created, but the existence of any debt was denied.
67. Dempsey v. Dempsey, 154 Fla. 728, 19 So.2d 52 (1944).
68. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1949) (... and in cases of estates by entirety, the ten-
ants, upon divorce, shall become tenants in common): Giachetti v. Giachetti, 157 Fla.
259, 25 So.2d 658 (1946); Kollar v. Kollar, 155 Fla. 705, 21 So.2d 356 (1945); Mark-
land v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629. 21 So.2d 145 (1945); Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3
So.2d 727 (1941); Francis v. Francis, 133 Fla. 495, 182 So. 833 (1938).
69. Valentine v. Valentine, 45 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1950).
70. Kollar v. Kollar, supra note 68; Markland v. Markland, sfupra note 68; Francis
v. Francis, supra note 68.
71. Valentine v. Valentine, supra note 69.
72. Lieber v. Lieber, 40 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1949); Hargett v. Hargett, 156 Fla. 730.
24 So.2d 305 (1946); Kollar v. Kollar, supra note 68.
73. Hargett v. Iargett, supra note 72.'
74. Markland v. Markland, supra note 68.
75. Lieber v. Lieber, supra note 72.
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Murder
The next means of termination that merits consideration is the situation
where one spouse murders the other. By operation of law the estate would
normally remain absolutely in the survivor. 6 But, to avoid allowing the
felonious party to profit by his or her own wrong, several theories have been
forwarded to resolve the problem.
One view77 is to the effect that although the husband survives his wife
she will be considered as the survivor in the eyes of the law. The conse-
quences of this theory are that the husband's rights are completel' defeated,
and the heirs of the wife receive the whole estate.
A position taken by some78 is that a constructive trust should be im-
pressed upon the estate. The husband would remain the legal title holder
but the heirs of the wife would have the use and enjoyment of the estate.
Upon the death of the husband the trust would pass to the heirs oi the wife
rather than those of the husband.
Similar to the previous view, another theory79 would impose the con-
structive trust, but would be guided by the normal expectancy of life for the
wife if she had lived. This view is more liberal to the extent thaf if the
husband should live past his wife's normal life expectancy her possibility
of survivorship would be removed and he would hold the absolute estate.
Of course, if he should die before the determined length of his wife's life
the estate would pass to her heirs.
A final position,80 and one which Florida has recently chosen to fol-
low,8' has been expounded by the Missouri court. It proceeds along the
rationalization that the death contemplated in the laws on estates by entire-
ties must be "in the ordinary course of events and subject only to vicissitudes
of life."82 Murder is not contemplated as a normal occurrence. The result
is that the husband by his willful and felonious act, has terminated the mari-
tal relationship. The courts consider such a termination to be similar to
that of divorce, since for the purposes of the entirety, in this situation, the
wife is not dead. Once the analogy of divorce is drawn it necessarily follows
that the estate would become a tenancy in common with a one-half undi-
vided interest passing to the heirs of the deceased spouse and the other one-
half interest remaining in the survivor.
76. Knapp v, Fredricksen, supra note 13.
77. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1918). ut cf.
feddingfield v. Estill & Newtnan, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907); Wenker v.
Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939) (wherein it was held that the husband al-
though murdering the wife would retain the whole estate).
78. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
79. Sherman v. \Veber 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 AtL 517 (1933).
80. Crose v. 1lolland, 357 Mo. App. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948); Barnett V.
Covey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).




Perhaps the most unique termination of all is the situation where the
owners of the entirety die under circumstances shrouded in such uncertainty
that it is impossible to determine which one predeceased the other. The
problem has never come before the appellate court of Florida, and has only
been decided once 8 3 elsewhere. Fortunately, the legislature has seen fit to
predetermine the issue and therefore when the problem does arise there will
be little difficulty in resolving it.
It was the former rule in Florida that there was no presumption as to
survivorship.84 Any person claiming a share in one of the deceased's estates
had the burden of proving his claim. If the burden was met the whole
entirety would pass to the claimant and the heirs of the other deceased
spouse would receive nothing.
To remedy this situation the legislature adopted the Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Law.85, This statute requires 0 that, when there is a common
disaster, the estate by the entirety should pass one-half to the heirs of the
wife and one-half to the heirs of the husband. In McGhee v. Henry, a
Tennessee case based on the common law doctrine which was followed in
the Uniform Act, it was determined that the common disaster terminated
the estate in the same manner as divorce. The deaths, in effect, ended the
estate before any possibilities of survivorship arose, since neither one could
survive the other. Once the possibilities were removed the estate became
one in common and a one-half undivided interest passed to the heirs of the
wife, with the other half going to the heirs of the husband. Because of its
decisions in divorce cases and in the case of murder, the Florida Supreme
Court is committed to the theory that the estate should become a tenancy
in common, This is important, because it means that the inheriting parties
will receive a one-half undivided interest in the entirety, rather than a divided
half of the estate as is possible under the wording of the statute.
CONCLUSION
It can not be stated dogmatically that the estate is either all good or all
83. MeChee v, Henry. 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W, 509 (1921).
84. Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 8I (857).
Other views on the subject are: Garpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 967, 204 N.W. 448
(1925) (in the absence of evidence the husband will be presumed to have outlived his
spouse); Carmody v. Powell, 32 Cal. App.2d 56, 89 P.2d 158 (1934) (survivorship will
be presumed from probabilities resulting from the strength, age and sex of the parties);
Watkins v. Home Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208 S.W. 587 (1919) (there is
no presumption, but where there is no evidence to aid in the determination of the prob-
lem the property will be distributed as if both had died at the same time); Garvee v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry., 220 Mo. App. 1245, 290 S.W. 655 (1927) (the presumption
is that they died at the same moment, and so the wife's estate is distributed as if she had
survived her husband, and his estate is distributed as if he had survived her).
85. FLA STAT. § 736.05 (1949).
86. FLA. STAT. § 736.05(3) (1949) ("Where there is no sufficient evidence that
two joint tenants or tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously,
the property so held shall be distributed one-half as if one had survived and one-half as
if the other had survived . . . ).
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bad. So many factors enter into the determination of its use that each situ-
ation must be considered in the light of its own merits. For this reason it
is impractical to list fully the benefits and the disadvantages, but it is advis-
able to weigh them when considering the use of the estate.
The greatest advantage to the parties is that the entirety is a convenient
means of protecting the surviving spouse from the tedious administration of
the decedent's estate. Then, too, it is a means of protection against improv-
ident debts of either of the parties. It is in these that the estate finds its
peculiar and justifiable function. 7
On the other side of the ledger, taxing in the entireties does not usu-
ally work in favor of the estate.8 8 Also, it is impossible for one of the
spouses to obtain credit or to mortgage the estate without the joinder of the
other. The rule, which requires such a joinder of the parties when encum-
bering the estate, protects the entirety against mismanagement by one party.
Conversely, it has not left room for the situation where, for economic rea-
sons, mortgaging would be advisable, but cannot be accomplished because
of the unwillingness of one of the parties to join for some underlying and
usually sentimental reason.
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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Supreme Court in Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board' has recently declared the Wisconsin Public Anti-Strike
law to be inoperative. Because of this ruling, the W.E.R.B. has been shorn
of its power to check strikes in public utilities. Provisions quite similar to
those in the Wisconsin act exist in many states, 2 and the present decision
affects their status as law. This article will compare some of the other im-
portant and similar statutes with the instant case in an attempt to render a
valid opinion as to their position as law.
STATE STATUTES
In the Amalgamated case, the Court interpreted the effect and applica-
bility of the NLRA of 1935,3 as amended by the LMRA of 1947, 4 and
found in a 6-3 decision that the state statute was in conflict with the
federal regulation and could not be permitted to be enforced. It was de-
87. Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
88. See note 54 suora.
I. 71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951).
2. Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia.
3. 49 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946).
4. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1949).
5. WIs. STAT. § 111.50 (1947).
